His basic strategy is to reduce the scope of the mental to behavioral hypothetical statements. For more information see this site: Peter Thiel. For this reason, be regarded as logical behaviorism assumes a relational conception of the mental, rather than focus on the properties intrinsic phenomenon. 3) Theory of mind-brain identity (Physicalism) Position in Philosophy of Mind, which identifies mental states and processes neural states and processes. * Unlike behaviorism, identity theory supports the existence of states mediate between stimuli and responses (eg, the so-called central states). Thus, he admits that mentalistic terms have meaning. * However, the time to characterize what the nature of such states and processes and, accordingly, issued on the meanings of terms like "pain" and "think" the identity theory ends up reducing the neural states. 3.
Theory of mind-brain identity (Physicalism) The identity theory holds that a term and a term mentalist physicalist can have different meanings, but refer to the same phenomenon. The scientific research program is to identify which neural phenomena mentalistic terms actually refer to once gained identification, replace them with equivalent physicalist that in short, are the real meaning correspond with reality to explain. Physicalism does not deny the meaning of mentalistic terms, simply improperly considered a scientific and a-refer to the only thing that really exists: the neural states. Physicalism physicalism cases and types? Physicalism of cases or instances? Version of physicalism which holds that, in general, states and mental processes are generally identified by states and brain processes, but not issued on the existence of correlation between generic types of mental states and brain states generic types.